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Notes on Agriculture 
and the State
Raymond R Hopkins
State intervention in agriculture has a long tradition. Lindert pre­
sents evidence in Chapter z for a changing pattern of agricultural 
policies in the course of economic growth. In early modern European 
and contemporary developing countries, the state taxes agriculture; 
in modern industrial states, the government subsidizes agriculture. 
This pattern does not arise from economic rationality (usually) but 
from political economic forces ascendent at a particular time in a 
nation’s history.
Political economy does help explain this evolution of agricultural 
policy. The dynamics are more complex, however, than those usually 
elaborated by economists. The purposes and consequences of state 
action are often divergent. Consequences are frequently unintended 
and sometimes perverse. Moreover, the very evolution of the state is 
closely linked to the development of agriculture and the effects that 
agricultural policies have upon it.
Anthropologists have closely linked the expansion of governing in­
stitutions—from minimalist governing systems to complex, modern 
state systems—with changes in agricultural production. The need to 
regulate market activity and resolve land disputes for settled agricul­
turalists, for instance, is postulated as the basis for the rise of African 
feudal-type systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Mair, 1962, 
pp. 29-31). Likewise, the centralization of state power and national 
policies in the modern era is linked to changes in agriculture (Barra- 
clough, 1976; Cochrane, 1979). State financing for agricultural
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modernization and the expansion of markets, some argue, played the 
critical role in the modernization of Europe and the expansion of the 
European state system (Wallerstein, 1974; Tilly, 1975; Tracy, 1982). 
The agricultural transformation is now seen as essential for success­
ful economic development in late-developing countries, such as Tur­
key, and very late developers, such as Sub-Saharan African countries 
(Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Eicber and Staatz, 1984; Mellor, Del­
gado, and Blackie, 1987; Akay, 1988). These countries typically have 
the largest portion of their labor force in agriculture and rely on ag­
ricultural export earnings for developmental capital goods imports. 
Their populations spend 40 to 70 percent of their household income 
on food.
Agriculture is regarded as central to developing an economy and to 
enhancing or undermining state authority (Scott, 1975, 1985; Hop­
kins, 1986, 1988). Given this centrality, two key questions arise. 
Why have states intervened in agriculture in the particular ways they 
have? Why have some interventions been successful, while others 
have been failures?
Purposes and Consequences
In different historical situations, states formulate different agricul­
tural policies. They differ because they seek particular goals and 
choose varying instruments of policy. It is difficult, of course, to be 
certain about tbe real purposes of states, as opposed to the merely 
stated ones. Furthermore, though formal, stated policies are generally 
accessible to the historian or economist in the form of explicit legal 
actions and recorded state expenditures, the actual implementation 
of policies and the use of state funds may vary considerably from 
those formally stated. This is particularly true in societies in which 
state capacity is weak, or a “soft” state, to use Myrdal’s term.* 
Throughout contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, where 
countries had a dismal record in agricultural performance in the 
1970s and 1980s, an examination of policies for regulating markets, 
subsidizing agricultural inputs, fixing prices, and even creating nutri­
tional safety nets exposed a wide gap between official policy and ac­
tual performance. Effective policy instruments may thus be highly
'This idea of “soft states” is discussed in Chapter lo by Faaland and Parkinson, using 
Myrdal’s 1953 distinction for Asian states.
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limited in periods of nascent state formation. Although rural popu­
lations often lack organization and appear vulnerable to the interests 
of the powerful, they nonetheless may pose a formidable obstacle to 
state manipulation, whether in Africa in the late twentieth century or 
in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chapter 10 by 
Faaland and Parkinson; Hyden, 1980; Scott, 1985; Cohen, 1988; 
Glickman, 1988).
These distinctions allow us to consider the historically dynamic 
process of the role of the state in agriculture. First, purposes for state 
action are conceived. Second, policy choices are made. The third 
stage is implementation, when the tools chosen are used. Finally, con­
sequences occur that in turn affect initial purposes. This dynamic is 
pervasive in the history of relations between the state and producers, 
merchants, and consumers. On the one hand, cases exist in which the 
state has used its resources to promote efficient agriculture, for ex­
ample, through provision of collective goods, with results that are 
positive for both economic and noneconomic values.^ Several Asian 
states are such cases. On the other hand, states can exploit agricul­
ture, thus undermining growth opportunities and alienating segments 
of society, as the research by Valdes in Chapter 3 suggests.
Political Economy Considerations in the Evolution of 
Agricultural Policy
The emergence of higher standards of living, thanks to industrial­
ization, has led to a welfare role for states. Governments cannot 
regulate markets solely in the interest of efficiency and social profit­
ability (if they ever could); they also must redistribute social values 
to ensure some degree of equity or justice (Okun, 1975). In the last 
several centuries, responsibility for administering to the needs of 
weak and vulnerable people has shifted from the private to the public
^For purposes here, the outcomes of state agricultural transactions are referred to both 
in terms of benefits that are directly economic—in the sense that they yield monetized 
effects whose net benefits and costs can theoretically be assessed using standard economic 
accounting methodologies—and in terms of noneconomic benefits, which include impor­
tant aspects of human behavior, such as loyalty to the government, voluntary compliance 
with policy, national self-esteem and rectitude, and other values. These are not monetized 
directly. Even shadow prices for such values would be hard to calculate since their mani­
festations in society often occur in step-level events. Changes in such values, however, are 
conceptually discrete movements. For example, government legitimacy can vary by degrees, 
but changes in government legitimacy outside revolutionary situations are not readily 
measurable.
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sector. The welfare state, with its plethora of programs that provide 
citizens minimum guarantees of goods and services, is a manifest re­
sult of this shift.
Food price policy has been a particularly important instrument in 
developing countries affected by this shift in public demands. To 
guarantee access to basic foodstuffs and augment the household in­
come of the extreme poor, many policy makers have adopted such 
measures as fixed prices or subsidy policies. Ethical considerations, 
arising from the very fabric of society itself, lead to this redistribu­
tion on behalf of the poor (Chambers, 1983). Most recently, this con­
cern of the government for the equity and the poor has been 
manifested (even in very poor states) in such initiatives as the 
UNICEF proposal for “adjustment with a human face” and the 
World Bank’s effort to achieve food security in Africa.^ Such policies 
are not without economic costs, however; the frequent trade-offs be­
tween equity and efficiency, between short- and long-term conse­
quences, and between economic and non-economic values, become 
especially poignant in cases when government capacity is already 
constrained by slow rates of economic development.
Models of Political Economy
Economists frequently criticize government policy that distorts 
markets. They argue that such interventions lead to non-Pareto opti­
mal outcomes, reduce efficiency, slow the expansion of the produc­
tion frontier, promote disincentives, and protect the unduly 
privileged. Such criticisms arise not only from neoclassical assump­
tions from which most economists approach social analysis but also 
from a genuine concern to seek better mixes of purposes and out­
comes from government intervention. Market failures, exploitative 
government behavior, and policies encouraging stagnation rather 
than economic growth seem pathological from this perspective. To 
account for such policy failures, economists frequently blame “poli-
^In Ghana, for example, the government adopted in 1987 a Programme of Actions to 
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), which was designed to offset the 
disproportionate or unfair burden of adjustment on vulnerable groups in Ghanaian society 
brought about by the economic recovery program initiated in 1983. PAMSCAD is sup­
ported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors. This 
intervention was seen as a short-term policy designed to cushion the effects of adjustment 
that were proving excessively harmful to the most vulnerable. Nevertheless, its total cost is 
estimated to be U.S. $84 million, which represents over 10 percent of annual government 
revenues.
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Figure 11.1. Three models of political economy
Model I: State as Arena
Groups outside government, based on rational interest calculations, seek to influence 
policy.
Variant A: . i i
Competitive, pluralist system: multiple groups, with changing alliances. Failure of public 
interest arises from divisible benefits that provide incentives to some groups (farmers) to 
pressure for policy preference, while more diffuse, larger groups are less active because 
problems of collective benefits offer weak incentives to mobilize.
Variant B: u- ■ ,
Noncompetitive, class-dominated situation: a group largely external to state officials 
(e.g., bourgeoisie, salariat, ethnic groups) dictates policy.
Model II: State as Actor
State officials and titleholders act to maximize their values (wealth, safety, affection, and 
so on). If the state has a high discount value, its leadership usually self-destructs. Its fea­
tures are rent seeking, bureaucratic self-protection and accumulation, and extortion by in­
dividuals. The state is seen by itself and others as competing with society to maintain the 
privileges of the state officeholders. If the state has a low discount rate, leaders may move 
toward a broader incorporation of popular interests with state interest a transformation, 
especially in “weak” states, toward a Model 111 type.
Model III: State as Builder
Goals are hierarchical to meet sovereign nation-state desiderata: security, growth, and wel­
fare. Weak states, typical among LDCs, give high priority to inculcating habits of compli­
ance and improving the probability of enforcement. Security, particularly domestic, is a 
central issue. As the state as agent becomes stronger, its capacity and interest in serving 
national goals move it to allocate more resources or allow more risk in policies aimed at 
economic growth and, eventually, welfare. Weak states that prematurely give high priority 
to economic growth and welfare frequently fail.
There are several key questions. Which mix best characterizes an actual state at a partic­
ular time? For that context, what advice about economic policy is most appropriate? For 
policy advisers who usually share Model HI goals, what policies best meet the preference of 
the state?
tics.” More recently, an analysis based on political economy has 
sought to interpret the development and change of policy in various 
historical contests (Staniland, 1985; Bates, 1989). Three basic ap­
proaches to political economy can be outlined (see Figure ii.i).
State as Arena. In the first model of political economy, the state 
is an arena for competing interest groups. Model I is the most prev­
alent political model for describing the basis of government action,
"Each of the political economy models may be found in contemporary analyses of vari- 
ous writers.
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particularly among economists (Anderson, 1987; Lele and Christian­
sen, 1989). Powerful interests, often urban based, as in a wbite-collar 
salariat class, or grounded in powerful landowners have partial or 
complete control over the instruments of the state and use them to 
advance their own interests/ For these powerful groups, the only 
trade-off is between short- and long-term gain; otherwise they pro­
mote their group’s rational choice strategies for state action, which 
will only coincidentally promote the interests of the society as a 
whole (Bates, 1981).
State as Actor. In the second model of political economy, the state 
is an actor in its own right. The clan of tribal societies, the royal 
families of the feudal ages, and the modern bureaucratic state with 
its cadres of officials are examples of the state as a rational calcu­
lator of costs and benefits for maximizing state power and the in­
come of its officials. Such calculations are, of course, constrained 
by the pliability of the state’s subjects and tbe technology the state 
can use to enforce its will as well as to foster economic efficiency. 
The basic calculus, however, derives from the interests of those run­
ning the state, whether royalty, a privileged class, or an entrenched 
bureaucracy.
Examples of the state as self-interested actor range from the reign 
of France’s Louis XIV with his diffidence toward those outside his 
state {“I’etat c’est moil") to the kleptocracy of Zaire.^ Activities of 
rent-seeking states have been caustically described by citizenries of 
countries ranging across the ideological spectrum. The Soviet Union, 
under Glasnost, has printed numerous complaints about manage­
ment both in agriculture and in officialdom generally. Such popular 
complaints about state-controlled exploitation are widely reported in 
the literature on dependency in Latin America and Africa; attitudes 
with the same valence are voiced more gently in criticisms of the 
heavy hand of government expressed by the American farm popula­
tion (Cochrane, 1979).
State as Builder. In the third model of political economy, the state 
focuses on building its capacity. Weak states seek power but not as 
an end in itself, as in the case of Model II. The state attempts to 
build support and discover policies that will best serve purposes re­
aper a discussion of urban bias, see Lipton (1977).
*For Zaire, see Callaghy (1984).
Notes on Agriculture and the State z8i
quired for survival of national sovereignty (Krasner, 1988). Accord­
ing to this model, the key distinction among states and their policies 
arises from the state’s capacity—as ranked on a continuum from a 
weak (or soft) state to a strong (or hard) one—to be an agent that is 
either ephemeral and elusive or tough and effective. The writ of state 
authority itself is the issue in question (Huntington, 1968). Often the 
state’s capacity extends no further than the capital city or the per­
sonal friendships of top leaders. A distinrtion between formal, de 
jure but ineffective states and stronger de facto states is particularly 
apt in modern conditions in Africa. Since 1980 several writers have 
alluded to the inability of the state to adopt policies that genuinely 
regulate the economy—that demonstrate capacity beyond control 
over imports and exports. Even in this realm, smuggling can be a 
major element allowing agriculture to escape state regulation (Hy- 
den, 1980; Bratton, 1989). It is important to recognize that even in 
countries where states represent a powerful element in society, such 
as the United States and the Soviet Union, state policy is not solely in 
control. Other fartors, particularly implementation problems and re­
actions of individual producers or consumers, frequently lead to pol­
icy outcomes quite different from those expected or predicted by 
sophisticated analysis. In these conditions, actions by the state to in­
tervene in agriculture, whether to support producers or consumers or 
to stimulate and redistribute wealth, may also represent a series of 
trials and errors in policy formation.
Purposes Served by State Intervention in Agriculture
In analyzing the history of agricultural policy in various countries, 
it may be useful to identify which of the three models of the state best 
fits the evolution of policies, either over all cases or at particular 
times, and the purposes served by state intervention. States as actors 
for themselves (Model II) are aggrandizing in character but fre­
quently have short-term successes and long-term failures. Perhaps 
the Philippines under Marcos fits this pattern. A state acting as an 
arena for competing groups may become captured by narrow inter­
ests, whether of powerful landlords or military officers, which may 
lead to important policy distortions and to lost opportunities for 
the economy as well as disaffection of the population (Hunting- 
ton, 1968). The third vision, the state as would-be entrepreneur, may 
best account for states that intervene in society primarily to bring 
order and some semblance of control over agriculture; the purposes
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of such weak states may be highly transient. Since the state is not 
deeply institutionalized—its leadership and circumstances change 
fairly quickly—it might also he opportunistic. The state’s search for 
optimizing behavior takes place under high uncertainty. Ironically, 
because weak states are not anchored in tradition or legal formali­
ties, they may be more erratic in the policies they follow, but they 
are also more influenced by policy advice given by economists. Poli­
cies of developing countries, especially those in Africa, frequently fit 
this model. The use of agricultural policy to advance development 
might be most critical in weak states; they have the greatest oppor­
tunities to restructure agriculture, particularly after a revolution or 
foreign conquest—for example, the land reforms in Japan, Taiwan, 
or China.
Six purposes seem to explain historical evolution in agricultural 
policy. Government intervention, whether best understood from the 
viewpoint of Models I, II, or III, has nearly always involved some 
mixture of these purposes, which are outlined below. Consequences 
of such efforts have also shaped future capacity for undertaking pol­
icies. Shortsighted, unsuccessful interventions can harm both the 
state and agriculture. The success of the economic transformation of 
agriculture, and the economy more generally, and the development of 
national loyalties and institutionalized state structures are all deeply 
interrelated consequences of evolving agricultural policy.
Extract Resources from Agriculture. The first purpose, classic for 
self-serving or rent-seeking states (Model II), is to extract resources 
from the agricultural sector for the purpose of state maintenance, in­
cluding guaranteeing a high standard of living among official or 
royal classes. Since such extraction from the production or exchange 
of agricultural products serves only to redistribute wealth to office­
holders and central state authorities, it represents the purest case of 
exploitation. Such action is the functional equivalent of mafioso-style 
extortion in the private sector. The government’s treatment of French 
peasants before the 1789 revolution is a classic instance of such a 
purpose dominating state policy. Zaire in the 1970s is another in­
stance (Callaghy, 1984; Scott, 1985). In Models I or III, extracting 
resources from agriculture may be linked by expenditure policies to 
more altruistic intentions and even consequences.
Expansion of the State. The state intervenes to expand its connec­
tions throughout society. The expansion of the state, for good or ill.
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requires replacing local fiefdoms and baronies with the imprint of 
central authority. States thus devise policies that require low invest­
ment in personnel and offer an opportunity to present central author­
ity as a positive force in the life of the peasantry (Laski, 1938; 
Moore, 1967; Bratton, 1989). Capitalist agriculture, for example, re­
quired centralized authority over local manor systems or tribal econ­
omies; the substitution of state regulations for such systems made 
possible the encouragement of capitalist practices. The state acted to 
assert its authority, however, rather than to base its policies on a the­
ory of economic development. This assertion of authority was most 
often the core purpose for such action (Tilly, 1975).
Protect Agriculture as a Resource. At times the state has inter­
vened to put agriculture on a competitive basis with other economic 
sectors. By nature, agriculture is a risky business. Climatic forces 
make crop yields uncertain. Protection of land tenure rights and fair 
marketing arrangements for the often poor and disorganized farmers 
depends on laws and government. Producers who provide the physi­
cal labor in agriculture, as distinguished from large landowners and 
managers, frequently have little power over the affairs of state. Such 
numerous but disorganized elements of society lack the free time or 
direct rewards to organize and pay the cost of collective bargaining 
with the state (Dahl, 1962, pp. 55-71; Olson, 1965; Lindblom, 
1977). The state can serve to secure socially efficient collective ben­
efits, which the “free rider” problem would otherwise cause to be 
neglected.
Promote Economic Development. The state undertakes various 
measures to stimulate economic development, such as investment in 
agricultural research, encouragement of new technology, or greater 
guarantees of profitability to producers taking risks or investing 
more of their own labor. This role of the state is the classic one as­
sumed by most economists (given the normative assumptions within 
which most of their work is cast). With this purpose in mind, ana­
lysts carefully try to assess the optimal benefit-cost ratios of various 
government investments to maximize efficiency among producers, 
lower marketing costs, and alleviate uneconomical fluctuations in 
demand and unemployment among the poor.
Improve 'Welfare of the Poor. The promotion of equity and the 
meeting of human needs is often cited as a goal of government policy.
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Subsidies targeted to the hungry poor, absorption of the adjustment 
costs for those moving out of agriculture, and other state-funded com­
pensatory actions may not have positive rates of return on investment 
but are justified by basic ethical considerations and, secondarily, per­
haps by the goal of state survival as a national, social instrument (see 
the purpose of political stability below). Such interventions to assist 
the poor might be a drag rather than a spur to general economic devel­
opment. Egypt and Sri Lanka, for example, have been cited as cases in 
which the burden of food subsidies, equaling 10 to 20 percent of total 
government revenues in the 1970s, was for economic growth, a long­
term negative factor. While industrialized states, such as the United 
States, Europe, and other members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, may be able to afford welfare state 
policies that include targeted food guarantees through programs such 
as food stamps, institutional feeding, and direct distribution, their costs 
are modest. Such redistribution, however, weighs heavily on states 
with lower incomes, less efficient economies, and a large portion of 
the population employed in agriculture (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988).
Promote Political Stability. Even from a strict economic perspec­
tive, political stability, however difficult to estimate, is worth some 
economic benefit.^ Maintenance of political authority reflects, in 
part, the political ties, both personal and ideological, between state 
leadership and the rural sector of the economy. Thomas Jefferson 
regarded the agricultural ethic as the basis of American democracy— 
an argument that has been supported two centuries later (McCon­
nell, 1952; Hadwiger and Talbot, 1979). Analogously, agriculture as 
an embodiment of state virtue has flourished under Felix Houphouet- 
Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire. Houphouet-Boigny proclaims himself the 
country’s “number one peasant.’’ Emotional and affective ties, there­
fore, can bind agriculture and the state in ways that sustain national 
character, project cultural values, and bolster political stability. These 
cultural forces can emotionally distort the rational choice template 
often placed upon government intervention (Potter, 1954; Hadwiger 
and Talbot, 1979).
In summary, the state intervenes in agriculture usually to accom­
plish one or several of these six purposes. Its success or failure fre-
^In Chapter 5, for example, Timmer cites the need for government intervention to accel­
erate efficient growth and income gains to farmers and access to food for low-income 
consumers, but he also argues that these interventions and others are important to main­
tain political legitimacy.
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quently depends on political economic factors. In Model I the state is 
an arena for powerful private forces to fix public policy. In Model II 
the state is a maximizer on behalf of itself as an actor—that is, it 
maximizes the private interests of officialdom. In Model III the state 
is also an actor, but one motivated by sovereignty goals and highly 
limited by missing information, uncertain popular loyalties, and inef­
fectual instruments. The three models are not mutually exclusive; 
they do, however, organize distinctive analytical elements to explain 
the actions of a state. In any actual case, some mixture of all three 
models is likely, but in most cases, one or another model will prove 
more illuminating and prediaive of state action than others, espe­
cially with respect to the state’s purpose and effect in interventions 
in agriculture.
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